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I.
The word which occurs most frequently in legal speech is right, and
yet it proves on investigation to be elusive in its meaning.
Why is right contrasted with law in English, while Recht stands both
for right and for law in German, jus in Latin, Droit in French, Pravo
in Slavonic languages? Obviously the nations of Continental Europe
laid stress in their terminology-on the unity of legal order-on the
fact that it is constituted and directed by the general authority of the
Commonwealth. On the other hand the English-speaking nations dis-
tinguish in terms between two aspects of the juridical arrangement-
between the public settlement of law and the consciousness of right
derived in the last instance from the convictions of individual men.
This dual aspect cannot, of course, be ignored by continental systems
either, and it appears in them in the shape of distinguishing adjectives-
objectives-subjectives Recht, "'droit objectif--droit subjectif" etc. We
might say in English: law is right taken objectively, from the point of
view of society, right is the personal conviction of men as to what is
due. Right is commonly understood as what a man considers to be
right from his personal point of view, while law is right as laid down
by a power which is above the parties, whose task is to arbitrate between
the various claims and to harmonize them as a whole.
The elements of a right are necessarily three. To. begin with, in
order that the right should exist it must be claimed. As it is subjective
in its essence it must originate in a striving of the subject-in other
words, the subject must assert something as his right. The subject
may be an individual or a State, because though the State has greater
means of waging its claims, it stands on a par with any other subject
as regards the statement and assertion of- right.
Claims are made every day in all directions; some of them give rise
to natural obligations and moral rights. A man who has conferred a
benefaction on another person, even if he has no kind of written and
valid acknowledgment in return, naturally supposes that he has a claim
on the gratitude or on reciprocal services of the obligee.
In order that such a moral claim should become juridical, it must pass
through a second stage, the stage of a declaration of right. Such a
declaration is the recognition by organized society that the claim is justi-
fied from the public pQint of view. As a rule, such justification enables
the person whose claim has been juridically recognized to bring an action
* The present article approaches the subject from a point of view which differs
from that taken up by the late Prof. Hohfeld in his well-known essay on the
classification of Rights and Duties. My aim is to examine the connection between
the juridical concept of right and the background of individual claims and social
interests.
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and to seek satisfaction in practice. As an illustration I will refer to a
case from the domain of public law in which the State and a citizen
were ranged against each other as parties. It occurred in 19Iii-Dyson
v. Attorney-General.' It.arose from the legislation carried through
on the initiative of Mr. Lloyd George when' Chancellor of the Exchequer
for the taxation of landed estates. In I9io an Act was passed con-
cerning the modes and effects of valuation and transfer of landed prop-
erty .with a view of estimating the "unearned increment" in the value
of estates produced by social conditions, e. g. by the opening of a rail-"
way line or the attraction of a centre of industry or trade.2 On the
strength of this Act measures had to be taken to ascertain the different
values of estates, and the Treasury issued a number of forms of enquiry
which occupiers of land had to answer under threat of penalties. One
of the land owners to whom form IV was sent, Mr. Dyson, refused
to fill in the form and to give the required answers and, as he was
threatened with prosecution under the Act, he applied to the Chancery
Division of the High Court for a declaration of right,3 maintaining that
the Act did not contain the authorization for a number of the questions
set down in the form and that, therefore, the issue of the form was
ultra vires. When the case was discussed in the Court of Appeal the
Attorney General pleaded that Dyson had no standing against the
Crown in this case except by way of petition of right, on account of the
prerogative of the Crown. I will refer to some of the remarks which
were made by a very.prominent Judge, Lord Justice Farwell, in giving
his decision against the Crown:'
"It has been settled law for centuries that in a case where the estate
of the Crown is directly affected, the only course of proceeding is by
petition of Right . . . but when the interests of the Crown are only
-indirectly affected, the Courts of Equity could and did make declara-
tions and orders which did affect the Crown." "It has not, since the
Commonwealth at any rate, been fhe practice of the Crown to attempt
to defeat the rights of its subjects by virtue of the great inconvenience
would be creAted by giving rise to actions of this kind disputing certain
demands of the Treasury because the greatest convenience to be con-
sidered is the convenience of the citizen who claims to be protected
against any form of injustice, and the small inconvenience that certain
orders of the Treasury, or other executive department, may be barred
and rescinded is small indeed and need not be taken into consideration."
The third element of right is' enforcement and this has to be dis-
tinguished from the pure declaration, because sometimes rights appear
in an imperfect form. They may be declared and recognized and yet
they may be insufficiently guaranteed and therefore ineffective in prac-
Si K. B. 410.
'(igio) Io Ed. VII and i Geo. V, c. 8.
2 The Statutory rules of 1883 (order 25, r. 5) admit expressly the validity of
':declaratory" judgments: The element of a declaration of right is contained in a
wider sense in every judgment in so far as the claim of a party is declared to be
in conformit with a rule.
'Dyson v. Attorney General, mspra at p. 421.
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tical application. It is by no means uncommon that claims are regarded
by courts of justice as being justified but unenfoiceable. Recently, a
pronouncement in that sense was made by Mr. Justice Hill in a case
for the restitution of conjugal rights ;i he said that the position of the
judge in such cases is unsatisfactory: he has to declare a right, his
declaration requires a restitution of conjugal rights, but what means are
there to enforce his decrees? -"It is the law, and it can be made, but
it cannot be enforced. In 99 per cent of the orders for restitution of
vonjugal rights one knows that they won't be obeyed. But still, the law
says the ordeTs can be made."8
Ihering, a jurist of great genius, put forward a theory which has won
a great deal of approbation, namely the theory that what is really effected'
by law is not recognition of rights.in the sense of an:admission of power
or as manifestafion' of the will, but a protection of interests. He lays
stress on the fact that law delimitates the rights for the sake of the
protection of interests even when the latter are not -sustained by con-
scious will. For instance, infants are protected in their interests by
law, and so are the insane. An infant may be protected in the womb
of its mother, because the State holds that certain continuous inherita-
ble interests have to be kept up in an orderly way in the line of organic
succession. The isane person again cannot legally exert his own will,
and nevertheless, his -rights of property and succession are protected.
He is subject to a certain r6gime of supervision and guardianship, which
is meant to protect his interests. Ihering's theory has been taken up
with approval by the socialists, because they discard the notion that
right originates in individual will and derive it mainly from the conflicts
of interests of social groups and classes on one side, from the actioh of
society on the other. From the juridical point of view, the whole con-
troversy seems to be based on a misunderstanding and as'a -matter of
fact, Ihering can be confuted from liis own writings. In his little book
on "The Struggle for Right,"'7 he lays stress on the private effort, on
the necessity for each personality to assert its claims to juridical power.
In other words, subjective assertion is one of the principal forces mak-
* ing for right. It-is not enough to speak of interests, one has to look
for the personal factor which is necessary for any effective assertion
of this kind, and, unless this personal factor is active, interests may be
dormant or suppressed for centuries. They get to be recognized in
consequence of personalefforts directed by will. The exceptional pro-
tection afforded to iifants or to the insane is not difficult to explain:
if you want to rear a plant you must take care of its seed; the deficient
and infirm are supported by society because human feeling refuses to
draw a sharp demarcation line between them and the healthy and has to
guard against the misuse of normal advantages. Besides the factor of
the will is not absent in these cases-only it is the will of a juridical
'See dictum of Mr Justice Hill in Bury v. Bury (923, Prob.) London Tines
of February &
" Ibid,
'Der Kampe Unes Recht (ist ed. 1872).
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person, namely of the State, which has to step ift. The situation may
be likened to that which arises in consequence of a trust: the trustee
acts for the beneficiary.
Claims may be urged by single individuals or by groups, but the essen-
tial point is that they start with the actions of parties. In other words,
interests are the material basis on which the will and the claim are
exerted. The common will of the State raises the incipient or incom-
plete claims of private persons to the level of recognized right.
The importance of the subjective or personal element in the establish-
ment of rights and the formation of law is made particularly clear if
we consider the historical experience of societies. Take any one of the
fundamental legal doctrines-property, succession, crime-you will find
that its development starts from one-sided assertions which are eventu-
ally compromised and harmonized by law. The primitive form of
appropriation is the setting up of defence in regard to certain objects-
food, cattle, clothing, a dwelling or a field-against outsider's, whose
relation to these things seems not justified, is regarded as an encroach-
ment or an intrusion and provokes resistance of the person aggrieved.
The original protection against violence consisted in the resolute self-
defence of the person attacked and of his kinsmen. In the case of
homicide it was for the relatives to take up the feud and to obtain
vengeance or compensation. The public authority intervenes at a later
stage in order to substitute arbitration, compromise, adjudication for the
conflict of subjective wills and forces, each striving for right from its
personal point of view. If we wanted to give up the notion of a sub-
jective origin of claims of.right, we should have to get rid of the ideas
of self-help and of the struggle for right. In our own days women
have asserted their claims to property and political rights in a struggle
with positive law.
The existence of the element of subjective right has nevertheless
been rejected by two schools of thought, which direct their onslaught
from two opposite sides, but join on the field of battle. From one side
come the partizans of force, those for whom might is the foundation
of all right-the schools Of Hobbes, of Austin, of Gunglowitz: they
do not recognize individual rights because individual man is in their
view an atomn when compared with Leviathan, with the Sovereign wield-
ing an overwhelming authority over an obedient community, From the
opposite side--in connection with groups seeking independence of the
State--the followers of Duguit and of the Syndicalists also deny the
existence of subjective right. We need not re-open the question as to
the meaning of sovereignty, but it is necessary to examine some of the
arguments levelled against the doctrine of subjective right.
Dugit, for instance, lays down the following propositions :"
"The conception of subjective right is nothing but a metaphysical
hypothesis. 'Whatever definition is provided for it, it must inevitably be
reduced to an extension of the human will, a power appertaining to
ix Traiti de Droit Constitutlionelle (2Cd ed. i§i) 65.
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certain wills and not conceded to others. An obligatory rule creating
rights for the benefit of one person, entitled to claim certain obligations,
can only proteed from a superior power."
It would be impossible to follow Duguit in all the ramifications of his
analysis, which, though it is constantly interspersed with contemptuous
references to the metaphysical treatment of the subject by his predeces-
sors, is itself conducted on scholastic lines. Abstractions are inevitable
not only in legal constructions, but in any kind of reasoning. The
problem is to use abstractions without losing touch with the concrete
realities which support them, and Duguit is not exempt from this obliga-
tion. We may well ask: what is to be put in the place of the combina-
tion or co-ordination of subjective rights by State's authority? The
co-ordination of conflicting forces by the recognition of social solidarity?
"Social solidarity" is an impressive word, but is it a juridical term?
Does it carry.the notion of a set of rules formulated and enforced as
the one obligatory law? Is it not rather the reflection of shifting
opinions, variously related and combined in public intercourse? We are
confronted again by the essential duality of social life-its manifesta-
tions as a fluid atmosphere of convictions and strivings on one hand,
and on the other, its manifestation, as a'definite juridical organization,
capable of laying down rules and enforcing their execution. In both
spheres the ultimate and irreducible atom is presented by the individual
and his will. The problem consists in estimating the proper relations
between this personal element and' the requirements of the society and
of the legal State.
II.
In view of the importance of the subjective aspect in the formulation
and attainment of rights we are led to inquire whether certain funda-
mental rights and claims ought not to be treated as inherent in nature
of a free man and citizen. Such rights would have to be distinguished
from another group, namely those produced by legal arrangement.
In the teaching of the so-called law of nature it was evident that
such a distinction should be established and the XVIII Century closed
with declarations amounting to the recognition of a fundamental truth,
namely of the existence of imprescriptible natural rights. The most
famous pronouncement of this kind is, of course, supplied by the revo-
lutionary Constitutions of France.
The first Article of the declaration of 1791 runs:9
"Men are born and remain free and equal in (their) rights.
Social distinctions can only be based on common utility."
These -Declarations have been criticized on the ground that in their
very general and abstract form they can have no practical application, as
their substantive value entirely depends on those limitations in law which,
after all, have to be admitted as necessary. Professor Dicey, in his
9Duguit et Monnier, Constitutions et les Principales Lois Politiques de La France
Depuis 1789 (3d ed. 1915) Textes, p. i.
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"Introduction to the Law of the Constitution," has made a brilliant
analysis of the contrast presented in this respect by the French Declara-
tions and the treatment similar questions have in England.10 There
was no formal declaration of Rights in English law, apart from Magna
Carta with its historical interpretation, and yet we have the Habeas
Corpus rules, which provide in specific terms of Statutes 31 Charles
II, c. 2, and 56 George III, c. IOO, remedies in the case of infringe-
ments of individual freedom: such infringements can be redressed by
application to tribunals, in a concrete form. It may be admitted that
Dicey points to a weak side in French law. Repeated Declarations
have not always enabled French Constitutions to guarantee individual
liberty during the Revolutioh or in the course of the different regimes
which immediately followed the Revolution. It cannot be denied that
in France too great a latitude was conceded to administrative action
in practice. This tendency has, however, checked to a great extent
under the sway of the Third Republic due to a consistent policy directed
toward the enforcements of strict legality. But, of course* it would
be very wrong to suppose that English Law does not recognize the essen-
tial doctrine which lies at the basis of the Declarations. It expresses
these essential principles in a different form, but it does recognize them.
In fact the contrast between French abstract statements of law and
English positive rules may b6 greatly exaggerated. In order to prove
this, I should like to draw attention to two kinds of considerations-
to the fact that in the domain of English and American Law, there
have been pronduncements of the same kind as the French Declarations,
and secondly, is that in cases actually decided in the English Courts there.
have been occasions when judges referred to principles which might
as well stand in a declaration of Right and form part of a systematic
statement as to fundamental rights. As to the first approach of the
argument, it is sufficient to say that the French declarations of Right,
considered historically, are only the last consequences of a movement
which is pre-eminently English and American. Undoubtedly the
French declarations were amply justified by the various misdeeds of
the French ancien rigime and the statements of grievances and claims
drawn up in the so-calledcahiers presented to the Etats Gniaux in 1789
contained various demands for the solemn recognition of rights.' 2 But
the channels of such a recognition had been indicated by the Bills of
Right of the American Colonies rising to the dignity of States.
It has often been urged from the time of Burke that in their movement
of liberation Americans applied ideas of right which may be regarded as
the inheritance of Common Law. This is undoubtedly one of the his-
torical roots of their freedom. But we ought not minimize the influ-
, (6th ed. 19o2) passim.
U i Stubbs, Se'ect Charters Illustrative of English Constitutional History (8th
ed. 19oo) p. 296.
"2 See Beudant, Le Droit individuel et l'Etat (i8gi) 134.
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ence of another factor of the appeals to human nature itself, which
are a characteristic manifestation of the political thought of the XVII
and XVIII Centuries. A striking expression of this factor of develop-
ment is presented for instance, by the polemics of James Otis'
3 against
the oppressive policy of the British Government in taxing the Colonies
without their consent. He wrote
"Nor do the rights of British colonists rest on a charter from the
Crown. Old Magna Carta was not the beginning of all things: nor
did it rise on the borders of chaos out of the unformed mass. A time
may come when Parliament may declare every American charter void,
but the natural, inhierent, and inseparable rights of the colonists as men
and as citizens would remain, and, whatever become of charters, can
never be abolished till the general conflagration."'
14
The Bill of Rights preceding the Constitution of Virginia of 1776
is particularly interesting because Lafayette in his speech to the con-
situent Assembly in France actually referred to it.15 We read in its first
clause :16
"That all men are by nature equally free and independent and have
certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society,
they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely,
the enjoyment of life and liberty with the means of acquiring and pos-
sessing 15roperty, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety."
The Declaration of Massachusetts of 178o is almost identical in prin-
ciple, although more detailed.' 7
But I want to call your attention, as -laying stress on another and
most important principle, to Article 5 of the Bill of Rights of New.
Hampshire:1
"Every individual has a natural and unalienable right to worship God.
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and reason: and no sub-
ject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained in his -person, liberty or estate
for worshipping God, in the manner and season most agreeable to the
dictates of his own conscience, or for his religious profession, sentiments
or persuasion; provided he doth not disturb the public peace, or dis-
turb others, in their religious worship."
The emphasis laid on freedom of conscience is characteristic, as this
principle did undoubtedly exert a decisive influence in the course of
the great moral revolt which forced, the colonists to abandon their home
, See Jellinek, Le Declaration Des Droits (19o2) 18 REvUE Du DROIT PUBLIC,
385. The American and English antecedents of the declarations of right am
presented very fully and clearly in this article: I can do no better than to follow
the Austro-German jurist as to this point.
'James Otis, The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved (3d ed.
1766) ; I Almon, A Collection of Most Interesting American Tracts (1766)
No. 2.
II Memoires-Correspondence, etc. de LaFayette (1838) 305.
" 2 Poore, American Charters and Constitutions (2d ed. I878) x9o8.
17 1 ibid. at p. 957.
is2 ibid. at p. 1281.
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in England and eventually gave them the strength to form new com-.
monwealths.
It would be superfluous to refer to the well-known rules of the actual
Constitution of the United States or to its XIVth Amendment, which
re-stated in a 9pecific form the 39th clause of the Great Charter.
9  I
will merely say that the well-known controversies as to the application
of the due process of law clause and the conflicting decisions of the
Courts in its regard are a notable illustration of the necessity of sup-
plementing any general pronouncement of this kind by considerations
derived from the varying circumstances in the midst of which the gen-
eral principle has to be put into action.
In any case, it is of great importance to ascertain that there are
claims of right which flow naturally from the conception of human
personality as a free agent and as entitled in normal circumstances to
certain legal guarantees of the realization of welfare. We may affirm
that historically the determined assertion of these claims was condi-
tioned not only by abstract rationalistic thought, but also by the des-
perate struggle for freedom of conscience against State absolutism in
the domain of religion.
The early Puritans of the XVIth Century were already appealing to
the imprescriptible rights- of man against their persecutors in Church
and State. According to:the summing up of an Anglican divine the
Puritans with whom he had to deal held that,
" .... by natural birth all men are equally and alike born to like
propriety, liberty and freedom; and as we are delivered of God by the
hand of nature into this world, every one with a natural innate free-
dom, and propriety, even so are we to live, every one equally and alike
to enjoy his birthright and privilege."20
History teaches us clearly in this case that we have to deal in social
life with a conflict of principles, each of which is necessary to human
development, but neither of which is entitled to claim absolute superi-
ority over the other. The principle of liberty tcarried to the extreme
produces anarchy; even so State power, suppressing all individual free-
dom, produces a condition of things, the outcome of which may be
emigration, separation, revolution. There is a core of truth ifi the
doctrine of imprescriptible and unalienable rights, and as for the neces-
sity of State law, it is illustrated by every-day experience. A com-
promise has to be effected and the juridical problem consists in settling
how far the line of compromise has to be drawn to the Right or to the
Left. The solution of the problem depends on wisdom and equity
rather than on rigid rules.
Now let us take up the other side of the inquiry-how are such prin-
ciples treated and in what way are they applied in concrete cases?
There are cases in which conflicts arise in the ordinary administration
i Stubbs, op. cit. .upra note Ii, at p. 300.
"Thomas Edwards, Gangraena r CLARKE PAPERs (Firth ed. 189i) LXI.
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of justice which turn on principles declared to be of unalterable right,
even apart from reference to chapter and verse, or the authority of
precedent. In Arlidge v. Local Government Board2' the Court of
Appeal (Vaughan Williams, L. J. and Buckley, L. J.) held that the
Board had in their examination of- the case infriinged the principles of
natural justice, and although the House of Lords ieversed this decision,
it did so on technical grounds and without questioning the existence of
such principles. 22 In Scott nge Morgan and another v. Scott,2 pro-
ceedings in an action for nullity of marriage were conducted in camera,
in accordance with a well established custom that certain cases demand-
ing the production of evidence of an indecent kind may by leave of the
court be tried in camera. When the case was decided in favor of the
plaintiff, Mrs. Scott's solicitor drew up an account of the proceedings
and circulated. it among certain persons connected with the parties. The
other side brought an action and accused Mrs.. Scott of having broken
the secrecy of the proceedings and of having thereby committed con-
tempt of court. This view was accepted and the case decided in favor
of the plaintiff by the Probate Division24 and by the Court of Appeal.
Yet in the House of Lords the decision was reversed on the strength of
the fundamental principle.of public trial. The reasons for such a
decision-were best expressed in the judgnent of Lord Shaw, who said
among other things :25
" . . . The Court had passed judgment in private and the case was
at an end. And now judgment has been passed upon the appellants in
respect of disclosing what occurred in Court.
"This result, which is declared by the Courts below to have been legiti-
mately reached under a free Constitution, is exactly -the same result
which would have been achieved under, and have accorded with, the
genius and practice of despotism.
"What has happened i a usurpation-a usurpation which could not
have been allowed even as a prerogative of the Crown, and most cer-
tainly must be denied to the judges of the land. To remit the main-
tenance of constitutional right to the region of judicial discretion is to
shift the foundations of freedom from the rock to the sand."
Another case arose in 1920 and was tried in a Division of the King's
Bench by Justices Darling, Avory and Sankey ;26 it bore on the extent
to which ministerial, orders made under the Defence of the Realm Act
can modify or abrogate fundamental rights of English citizens. The
facts of the case wer6 as follows -In 1919 the plaintiff, Chester,
brought an action against the defendant, Bateson, in order to recover
possession of a house occupied by Bateson after the expiration of the
term of a lease. When the defendant refused to quit and the landlord
S[1914] I K. B. i6o.
Local Government Board v. Arlidge [1915, H. L.] A. C. I2O.
(913, H. L. [1913] A. C. 417.
"[1912] P. 241.
Scott v. Scoft, supra note 23, at p. 476.
Chester v. Bateson [1920] I K. B. 829.
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brought his action before the county magistrates, they refused to inter-
fere because there was' an order of the Minister of Munitions which
forbade any kind of ejectment of persons connected with the fabrication
of munitions. The trial was resumed in the King's Bench. The war
was at an end, but the regulation still stood, therefore the Court had
to decide whether the regulation made by the Minister of Munitions
was ultra vires or not. The Divisional Court held that the order of
the Minister was illegal and invalid as to the point at issue. One of
the reasons for the decision was that the Minister had threatened any
person bringing an action for ejectment without his leave with terms
of imprisonment and a fine. This amounted to a deprivation of English
citizens of their right of access to Courts for the purposes of obtaining
justice.
Mr.Justice Avory said :27
"This appeal raises a question as to the legal validity of that portion
of the second clause of Defence of the Realm Regulations which pro-
vides, 'whilst the order remains in force no person shall without the
consent of the Minister of Munitions take or cause to be taken any
proceedings,' etc. The effect is that if any person without the previous
consent of the Minister of Munitions commences proceedings in any of
the King's Courts of Justice, of the kind prohibited, he is guilty of a
criminal offence and liable to six months' imprisonment or a fine of
£ioo, or both, and the only question for decision is whether this portion
of the regulation is ultra vires the statute under which it purports to be
made." 28 The Court decided it was ultra vires. "The purpose in view
whien the regulation was made-namely, to prevent the disturbance of
munition workers in their dwellings-may without doubt be said to be
reasonable, and a regulation designed to prevent such disturbance, pro-
viding that no orde for ejectment should be made except under condi-
tions prescribed, would probably be held to be intra vires the statute.
But the objection which is made to the regulation as it stands is that
it "deprives the King's subjects of their right of access to the Courts
of Justice, and renders them liable to punishment if they have the
temerity to ask for justice in any of the King's Courts."
The problem of righs of man and of the citizen is not settled simply
by a criticism of the declarations of Rights. They may be too abstract
and general; nevertheless the admission that in civilized and well-
ordered States the individual is a quantity to be safeguarded and treated
with proper respect-this admission involves a number of consequences
as to freedom of movement, freedom of opinion, freedom in choice of
occupation, freedom of petition and judicial action, etc., which have their
roots in self-consciousness of the individual and not merely in arrange-
ments of Law by the State.
As a general conclusion it may be said that the will of the- State is
not the one factor building up Right and Law in human society. There
is a second factor of equal importance-the consciousness of man as to
their rights. In practice Law appears as a shifting compromise between
these two factors.
" Ibid. at p. 835.
"Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act (915) 5 Geo. V, c. 8.
